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BANKS AND BANKING-DEPOSIT OF BONDS W1TIIOUT INTENTION THAT
SPECIFIC BONDS SHALL BE RETURNED--RIGHT OF DEPOSITOR To PREFERRED
CLAI.-The plaintiff delivered Liberty Bonds to bank A, under an agree-
ment that upon 60 days notice the bank would redeliver bonds of the same
issue and amount. The agreement further provided that the bank should
pay interest on the par value, in addition to the coupon rate. The bonds
were sold the day after their receipt. Bank A was then reorganized as
bank B, the latter receiving all the assets and assuming all the obligations
of bank A. Upon the subsequent insolvency of bank B the plaintiff sought
to establish a preferred claim. The trial court held his claim to be prior
to those of general creditors. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be aih reed.
Stults v. Gordon. 167 N. E. 564 (Ind. 1929).
If the transaction fell within the category of "special" deposits, the plain-
tiff's right to a preferred claim would be clear. 1 MORSE, BANKS & BANK-
ING (5th ed. 1917) §§ 183, 185; 2 ibid. § 630. But most deposits which
courts have termed "special" have contemplated no use of the deposit by
the bank for its own purposes and therefore do not appear to embrace the
instant situation. Cf. Russet v. Bank of Nampa, 31 Idaho 59, 169 Pac. 180
(1925) (note left for collection); Leach v. Farmers' & Merchants' Say.
Bank, 202 Iowa 885, 211 N. W. 535 (1926) (bonds deposited for safekeep-
ing) ; Fogg v. Tyler, 109 Me. 109, 82 Atl. 1008 (1912) (money left wrapped
and initialed while depositor on trip). Although preferred claims have
also been allowed on deposits of collateral security paper of which the bank
has a limited use, its duty to return the identical paper forms the basis for
the preferred status. MORSE, loc. cit. supra. Neither these cases nor an
analogy to the preferred position of a depositor of grain in a warehouse
can support the instant holding. Such a depositor is given preference over
the general creditors of the warehouseman, even though he has consented
to the intermixing of his grain with that of other depositors, because it is
a duty peculiar to a warehouseman to keep in his elevator sufficient grain
to meet all outstanding receipts. 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 154;
see Snydauker v. Blatchlcy, 177 111. 506, 511, 52 N. E. 742, 744 (1898).
Generally, if an intermingling of money deposited with that of the bank is
contemplated, the depositor will not be given a preference on insol%, ncy of
the bank. Butcher v. Butthr, 134 Mo. App. 61, 114 S. W. 536- (1908);
Mutual Accident Ass'n r. Jacobs, 141 Il1. 261, 31 N. E. 414 (1892) ; Khne
v. Union Trust Co., 133 Mich. 602, 95 N. W. 715 (1903) ; Co.-rWAN, CASES
ON TRUSTS (1925) 124, n. 8:3. In the instant ca -e. the bank's agreement to
pay interest in addition to the coupon rate, and the 60 day notice pro sion,
indicate that the parties contemplated that the bonds might be -old. In
other words, the plaintiff, like any general creditor, deliberately determined
to trust the dcfendant bank .%.th the proceeds of the bonds. See Comment
(1927) :16 YALE L. J. C 2. The specification that bonds of the -ame series
and amount were to be -t,:rn, .1 after 60 days notice zeems no more than a
stipulation that the bank -hould have on hand sufficient funds to purchase
such bonds on tL trarket. Y t this stipulation zeeniq to have induced the
court to allow the plaintiff a preference over the general creditors for
which no justification appears.
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BANKS AND BANKING-Two NAME DEPosrrs-EFFEcr oF NEW YoRK
STATUTE DESIGNATING CREATION OF JOINT TENANCY wITit RIGHT OF SUn-
vivoRsHip.-The plaintiff's testatrix had savings accounts in four banks which
she transferred to joint accounts in the names of herself and the defendant,
her granddaughter, payable to "either or the survivor of them." She later
notified each of the banks that the "privilege" granted to the defendant to
draw out money was revoked. She withdrew the money in two
of the banks and redeposited it in her own name but, before her death, re-
established these accounts in the joint names. The lower court held that the
defendant was entitled only to the money in these two accounts. Held, on
appeal, that the defendant is entitled to the money in all four banks since,
under the New York statute [BANKING LAw § 249], a deposit payable to
two persons, either or the survivor, creates a joint tenancy, thereby giving
the defendant a vested interest which the depositor could not revoke. Mos:o-
witz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 167 N. B. 506 (1929).
Where there has been no attempted revocation courts generally, in the
absence of statute, uphold the survivor's claim on one of several theories
(gift, trust, joint tenancy, contract). (1926) 36 YA. L. J. 138. The
common law rule in New York was that the survivor would take if such was
the intention of the parties. Kelly v. Beers, 194 N. Y. 49, 86 N. E. 980
(1909). But not where the joint account was opened solely as a matter
of convenience. Matter of Bolin, 136 N. Y. 177, 32 N. E. 626 (1392). The
banking law of 1909 declared that deposits in the "either or survivor" form
created a "joint tenancy." Laws of 1909, c. 10, § 144. This was held to
create merely a rebuttable presumption. Clary v. Fitzgerald, 155 App.
Div. 659, 140 N. Y. Supp. 536 (4th Dep't 1913), aff'd, 213 N. Y. 696, 107
N. E. 1075 (1915). The law was then amended by adding a provision
that "the making of the deposits in such form shall, in the absence of
fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or pro-
ceeding to which either such savings bank or the surviving depositor
is a party, of the intention of both depositors to vest title to such
deposits and the additions thereto in such survivor." BANKING
LAW § 249. Under this statute the survivor's claim has been up-
held although the deceased opened the account in their joint names
solely as a matter of convenience. Heiner v. Bank, 118 Mic. 326, 193
N. Y. Supp. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1922); McNett v. Crandell, 172 App. Div. 375,
158 N. Y. Supp. 1020 (3d Dep't 1916). But the survivor's claim has been
denied where the decedent did not intend to benefit the survivor during his
lifetime, but attempted merely to make a testamentary disposition. Matter
of Fonda's Estate, 206 App. Div. 61, 200 N. Y. Supp. 881 (3d Dep't 1923).
The statute has no application where the account is not in the itatutory
form. Matter of Peno's Estate, 128 Misc. 718, 221 N. Y. Supp. 205 (Surr.
Ct. 1927) ; see Matter of Kimball's Estate, 124 Misc. 181, 182, 201 N. Y.
Supp. 757, 759 (Surr. Ct. 1924). Nor where decedent merely directed the
bank to open a joint account and the bank opened it in the statutory form.
McDonald v. Sargent, 121 Misc. 437, 201 N. Y. Supp. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ;
Hayes v. Claessens, 189 App. Div. 449, 179 N. Y.'Supp. 153 (3d Dep't 1919),
aff'd, 234 N. Y. 230, 137 N. E. 313 (1922). Such cases must be decided on
common law principles. See Havens v. Havens, 126 Misc. 155, 170, 213 N.
Y. Supp. 220, 242 (Sup. Ct. 1925). Where both parties are alive, and the
contest is between them, it has been held that the presumption of joint
tenancy is rebuttable and that the actual relationship intended may be shown.
Scanlon v. Meehan, 216 App. Div. 591, 216 N. Y. Supp. 71 (4th Dep't 1926).
The instant case holds that if a joint tenancy is intended, the depositor can-
not revoke it. The court intimates that the defendant would have prevailed
even had the testatrix drawn out the money and redepositcd it instead of
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merely notifying the bank. But quaere. The court might have formulated,
by analogy, a rule of "tentative joint tenancy" similar to that applied in
the "tentative trust" cases. Cf. Matter of Totton, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E.
748 (1904). Its failure to do so was probably justified in view of the
statute. But it is doubtful whether the result reached will accord with
the intentions of the parties in such cases.
CONFLICT OF LAWS--L MITATION OF ACTIONS.-The plaintiff instituted
suit in Texas to recover on a fire insurance policy issued in Mexico by the
defendant Mexican company. More than one year had elapsed since the
accrual of the cause of action. The defendant set up the Mexican limita-
tions period of one year. In Texas the limitations period was two years.
The lower court allowed a recovery. Held, on appeal, that even though
the Mexican statute of limitations be regarded "as a limitation on the
right and not merely on the remedy," it is inapplicable in Texas where
public policy forbids a limitation period of less than two years in such
cases. Judgment affirmed. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 15 S. W. (2d)
1028 (Tex. 1929).
Generally, statutes of limitation are regarded as procedural and the
limitation period of the forum is controlling. LeRoy v. Crowninshield, Fed.
Cas. No. 8269 (C. C. D. Mass. 1820); M'Elmoyee v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312
(U. S. 1839). The statute of the forum has been held not to begin to run
until the defendant, and sometimes until both parties, come within the
state, regardless of their residence. Mason v. Union Mills Paper Co., 81
Md. 446, 32 AtI. 311 (1895); Hatch v. Spofford, 24 Conn. 432 (1856). Many
states now provide by statute, however, that no action will lie if the remedy
is barred by the law of the state in which the cause of action arose.
Canadian Northern Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 40 Sup. Ct. 402 (1920);
MINN. GEN. STAT. (1913) § 7709; Note (1900) 48 L. R. A. 639. Where the
limitation period provided by the law of the state governing the obligation
is construed by that state as limiting the "right" rather than the "remedy,"
the court of the forum will apply the foreign statute of limitations. Davis v.
Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 24 Sup. Ct. 692 (1904) ; Fairclough v. Southern Pacific
Co., 171 App. Div. 496, 157 N. Y. Supp. 862 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd, 219 N.
Y. 657, 114 N. E. 1066 (1916). It has been held, however, that the limita-
tion period of the forum will be applied if it is shorter than the foreign
period. Engel v. Davenport, 194 Cal. 344, 228 Pac. 710 (1924), rev'd on
other grounds, 271 U. S. 33, 46 Sup. Ct. 410 (1926); see Note (1913) 46
L. R. A. (N. s.) 687, 690; Comment (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 492; Comment
(1925) 13 CALIF. L. REv. 411. The validity of a contractual stipulation re-
garding the time within which suit must be brought depends in the first
place on the law governing the contract. Chicago R. I. and P. Ry v. Thollp-
son, 100 Tex. 185, 97 S. AV. 459 (1906). But even if it be valid by such law,
the court of the forum may still reject it on grounds of public policy where
the period ztipulated is deemed unreasonably short. Greenspou-Neiwvpwi
Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 1929 Am. Mar. Cas. 1741 (N. Y. App. Div.
2d Dep't 1928) ; Sapinkapf v. Cunard Steamship Co.. 235 N. Y. Supp. 89
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1929); (1929) 38 YAIE L. J. 987. But see Standard
Oil v. Tampico Nay. Co., 21 F. (2d) 795, 796 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). The
instant court applies this rule of policy in refusing to give effect to a
foreign statute of limitations which is regarded as limiting the Vright."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONTRACTS--POWER OF GOvERNMENT TO ENFORCE
WVAR-TIME CONTRACT TO ACCEPT AGRED PROFIT-RECOVERY Op" EXCVSs
PROFITS.-The United States Government brought an action to recover from
the defendant wool dealers gitoss profits claimed to have %een made in the
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year 1918 in excess of the maximum permitted by regulations promulgated
by the Wool Division of the War Industries Board for the purpose of
handling the domestic wool clip of 1918. The defendant, in order to obtain
from the Wool Division a permit to operate as an "approved" wool dealer,
had agreed in writing to comply with its regulations, among which was
the stipulation that the Government should set the price of wool, and
collect and dispose of dealers' annual gross profits in excess of 5%. Com-
pliance with the regulations was a condition of doing business with the
Government. The lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer. Held, on
appeal, that the agreement was not void for want of consideration and that
prices were not fixed by the Government but agreed to by the parties. Judg-
ment reversed. United States v. Kraus, 33 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
It was foreseen that the shortage of supply relative to the extraordinary
demands of the war would cause the price of wool to rise in 1918 to exorb-
itant heights and that the Government would be required of necessity to
pay such high prices, unless means were devised to prevent this rise. See
United States v. McFarland, 15 F. (2d) 823, 82 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
Although the Government could doubtless have appropriated wool for war
purposes, the constitutional requirement that it must pay just compensation
for what it takes is one which war does not suspend. Monongahela Navi-
gation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct 622 (1893) ; National
City Bank of New York v. United States, 275 Fed. 855 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
By the ingenious plan of the Wool Division constitutional and attendant
practical difficulties were avoided. In order to obtain a permit to act as an
"approved" dealer, practically all dealers signed an agreement to comply
with the regulations of the Wool Division, the effect of which was to direct
all wool to the Government at a price set in advance by the Government and
agreed to by the dealer, rather than to direct wool to the Government at a
price to be judicially determined. See United States v. Powers, 274 Fed.
131, 132 (W. D. Mich. 1921). In every case in which the Government re-
covered profits in excess of those allowed under the regulations of the Wool
Division, the dealer had, as in the instant case, signed the agreement. United
States v. Powers, 274 Fed. 131 (W. D. Mich. 1921) ; United States v. Gordin,
287 Fed. 565 (S. D. Ohio 1922) ; United States v. Traugot. Schmidt & Sons,
2 F. (2d) 290 (E. D. Mich. 1924). And in every case, except one, in which
the Government failed to recover such excess profits, the dealer had not
signed the agreement. United States v. McFarland, 15 F. (2d) 823 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1926) ; United States v. Avery, 30 F. (2d) 728 (N. D. N. Y. 1927).
The single case in which the Government failed to recover, though the wool
dealer had signed the agreement, seems ill-advised in failing to distinguish
between an attempt of the Wool Division by the mere fact of promulgation
of its "regulations" to bind all dealers by them and an attempt to hold
the dealer to the regulations under a signed non-compulsory agreement.
United States v. Smith, 32 F. (2d) 901 (D. lass. 1929), overruling United
States v. Smith, 285 Fed. 751 (D. Mass. 1922). Although in a real sense
the Government in 1918 "fixed" the price of wool, the instant case illustrates
the practical way seized upon by the Wool Division of utilizing the informal
sanction of public opinion to lead a dealer into an agreement which would
have formal legal sanction, thus avoiding the practical and legal difficulties
of appropriation and fixing of prices.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF NEGROES TO VOTE IN DEMOCRATIC PRI-
mARIEs.-A Texas statute authorizes political parties to determine qualifica-
tions of members eligible to vote in the primaries. [Tex. Acts 1927, c. 67, §
1] By party resolution negroes were denied the right to vote in the Demo-
cratic primaries. Nixon, a qualified Democratic voter, but a negro, brought
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an action for damages against the election judges for refusing to permit
him to vote in the primary, pleading a violation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. Held, that the primary
officials were not responsible, since they were not acting as governmental
officials. Nixon v. Condon, 34 F. (2d) 464 (W. D. Tex. 1929).
A prior Texas statute directly barring negroes from the Democratic
primaries was held unconstitutional. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 47
Sup. Ct. 446 (1927). The instant statute, permitting the barring of a
negro by "non-governmental" action, attempts to circumvent the principle
of that case that "the same reasons that allow a recovery for denying the
plaintiff a vote at a final election allow it for denying a vote at the primary
election that may determine the final result." See Nixon v. Herndon, supra
at 540, 47 Sup. Ct. at 446; Note (1927) 5 Tux. L. REv. 393. The instant
court stated that political parties are private voluntary associations and
that therefore the actions of the primary officials are of a private and not
governmental nature, so that the Federal Constitution is not applicable.
Cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18 (1883); see (1929) 13
MINN. L. REV. 376. Until the turn of the century party nominations were
considered the private affairs of voluntary associations. MERRIAm, AMER-
ICAN POLITICAL IDEAS (1920) 278. But primary laws passed since then,
setting up and regulating primaries as an optional or compulsory method
of selecting party candidates, have been upheld in all states as being a
matter of fundamental public concern in preventing manipulations of polit-
ical parties. Sargent, Law of Primary Elections (1918) 2 MINN. L. REV.
192, 205. In such laws, tests of party affiliation for primary voting, in
addition to constitutional voting qualifications, may be prescribed. Lodger-
wood v. Pitts, 122 Tenn. 571, 125 S. W. 1036 (1910); State v. Michel, 121
La. 374, 46 So. 430 (1908); Hopper v. Stack, 69 N. J. L. 562, 56 At. 1
(1903). Contra: Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370, 52 Pac. 659 (1898) ; People
v. Election Com'rs, 221 Ill. 9, 77 N. E. 321 (1906). The test of party affili-
ation may be left to the determination of party officials. State v. Michel,
supra. But a statute under which the party is allowed to bar negroes, and
which thus achieves indirectly what a state cannot do directly, has been
held unconstitutional. West v. Bliley, 33 F. (2d) 177 (E. D. Va. 1929). The
instant court distinguished the case of West v. Bliley, eupra, on the qiles-
tionable ground that Texas, unlike Virginia and other states, does not pay
primary expenses, and that therefore Texas primaries are actions of private
associations. Cf. Waplcs v. Marrast, 108 Tex. 5, 184 S. W. 180 (19t6)
(holding that the state cannot pay primary expenses because parties are
private associations, and that therefore payment would not be for a public
purpose). But cf. Commonwealth v. Virginia, 111 Va. 849, 69 S. E. 1027
(1911) (holding that a primary is part of the election machinery of the
state and that the state can pay such costs) ; State v. Felton, 77 Ohio 554,
84 N. E. 85 (1908) ; Kenneweg v. Allegany Co. Com'mrs, 102 Md. 119, 62 Atl.
249 (1905); State -i. Michel, supra. It is doubtful whether the United
States Supreme Court will allow to the party officials acting under statutory
authority the power of discriminating against the negro which it denies to
the legislature itself.
CONTIACTS-OFrrR AND AcCErANcE-ACEPTANCE BY TELEGRAPII OF
MAILED OFFER.--The defendant sent a letter from Massachusetts to the
plaintiff in Georgia, olering to sell him a tract of land, without stipulating
the mode of acceptance. On the day before the offer would have expired,
the plaintiff telegraphed an acceptance subject to a survey and examina-
tion of title. In a suit for specific performance the lower court gave judg-
ment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal (one judge dissenting), that no con-
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tract was consummated. The court, by way of dictum, said that the case
was governed by the law of Massachusetts, since the telegraphed acceptance,
not being sent by an agency authorized by the offeror, would take effect
only when received. Judgment reversed. Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F. (2d) 415
(C. C. A. 1st, 1929).
It is well settled that, unless otherwise required by the offeror, an offer is
accepted when and at the place where the acceptance is started in trans-
mission through the same agency by which the offer was sent. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Wheeler, 245 Pac. 39 (Okla. 1926) (telegraph); ANSoN,
CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) § 40. The place of acceptance in such cases
is the place from which the acceptance is mailed, telegraphed, or telephoned,
as the case may be. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 97. But where no
mode of acceptance is provided for in the offer, and the acceptance is trans-
mitted by an agency other than that by which the offer was sent, the cases
are in conflict as to whether mere sending, or whether actual receipt of
the acceptance, completes the contract. Courts which require actual re-
ceipt proceed on the theory that the offeror using any given agency of
communication impliedly authorizes the communication of an acceptance
only through the same agency. Scottish-Anerican Mortgage Co. v. Davis,
96 Tex. 504, 74 S. W. 17 (1903) (acceptance by mail of offer banded to
offeree personally); Elkhorn-Hazard Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corp.,
20 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927). It has thus been held that where an
offer is sent by mail no contract is completed by the mere dispatch of a
telegraphed acceptance. Lucas v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 131 Iowa
669, 109 N. W. 191 (1906). But ef. Perry v. Mt. Hope Iron Co., 15 R. I.
380, 5 AtI. 632 (1886). In support, it has been argued that the risks of
error by telegraph are very great, and further that nothing tangible is
sent by the offeree. 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra § 82. But other courts
regard the offeree as authorized to accept in any reasonable mode, accord-
ing to prevailing commercial custom. Henthorn v. Fraser, [1892] 2 Ch. 27;
Note (1906) 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1017. Thus, although an offer by telegram
would seem to imply a request for a prompt reply, such an offer has never-
theless been held accepted by the mere posting of a letter. Farmers' Pro-
duce Co. v. McAlester Storage & Commission Co., 150.Pac. 483 (0k1a.
1915) ; see Pheniz Insurance Co. v. Scludtz, 80 Fed. 337, 343, 344 (C. C. A.
4th, 1897); cf. Diudley Tyng & Co. v. Converse, 180 hfich. 195, 14G N. W.
629 (1914) (acceptance by telephone of offer sent by post) ; Stephen M.
Weld & Co. v. Victory Mfg. Co., 205 Fed. 70 (E. D. N. C. 1913). Under the
reasoning of either line of cases, the question whcther the telegraph was
an authorized mode of acceptance would seem fairly to involve consideration
of the position of the contracting parties in the light of common and reason-
able business practice. 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra § 83; Corbin, OfTer and
Acceptance (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 169, 204. In view of the widespread use
of the telegraph in present business dealings, a decision that an acceptance
by telegraph is not authorized or contemplated by a mailed offer seems ques-
tionable. See (1928) 16 CALIF. L. R-v. 320; (1929) 18 ibid. 82; (1929) 8
TEX. L. Rv. 137.
CORPORATIONs-DIssoLuTIoN ON PETITION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS.-
The plaintiffs, holders of one third of the shares of the defendant corpora-
tion, all the shares of which were held by seven persons, petitioned for its
dissolution under a statute authorizing such a petition by the holders of at
least one third of the shares when they deemed it "beneficial to the interests
of the stockholders that the corporation be dissolved." [OHIO GEN. CODE
(Page, 1926) § 11938] The court found that after ten years of successful
business, discord arose between the plaintiffs and the majority shar.holders;
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that the latter discontinued the salaries which the plaintiffs received as
officers, in lieu of dividends, and increased their own salaries; and that
because of the lack of harmonious cooperation between the parties, the cor-
poration would certainly suffer. The defendants contended that dissolu-
tion should not be decreed, since the court could stop the payment of exces-
sive salaries and other abuses by granting less drastic injunctive relief.
The trial court ordered a dissolution. Held, on appeal, that the judgment
be affirmed. Schmitt Realty & Inv. Co. v. Monks, 168 N. E. 213 (Ohio
1929).
It is very generally said that equity, in the absence of statute, is with-
out jurisdiction to dissolve a corporation on the petition of minority share-
holders. See Feess v. Mechanics' State Bank, 84 Kan. 828, 835, 115 Pac.
563, 565 (1911), L. R. A. 1915A 606; 8 FLErcnER, Cyc. OF CORPORATIONS
(1919) § 5543. Some courts purport to hold to this rule without qualifica-
tion. See Ashton v. Penfield, 233 Mo. 391, 429, 135 S. W. 938, 948 (1910);
(1923) 37 HARv. L. Rur. 267. But on a strong showing that the corpora-
tion's property is in imminent danger of being lost, such a court will ap-
appoint a receiver temporarily, until the affairs of the corporation aro
straightened out. Ashton v. Penfield, supra; (1923) 10 MINN. L. REv. 158.
Other courts recognize exceptions to the rule. See BALLANTINE, CORPORA-
TIONS (1927) § 253; cf. Goodwin v. Von Cotzhauscn, 171 Wis. 351, 360,
366, 177 N. W. 618, 621 (1920). Thus, equity has decreed a dissolution
where the purpose of the corporation has been shown to be impossible of
attainment. Minona Cement Co. v. Reese, 167 Ala. 485, 52 So. 523 (1910) ;
Hall v. City Park Brewing Co., 294 Pa. 127, 143 Atl. 582 (1928). And
dissolution has been ordered where the majority shareholders have fraudu-
lently carried on the business of the company for their own interest to the
injury of the minority. Brent v. Brister Sawmill Co., 103 Miss. 876, 60 So.
1018 (1912); Dill v. Johnston, 72 Okla. 149, 179 Pac. 608 (1919) ; Tampa
'Waterworks Co. v. Wood, 121 So. 789 (Fla. 1929); of, Goodwin v. Von
Cotzhauson, supra. Although mere diagreement as to the management of a
corporation is insufficient, dissension among stockholders so serious as to
prevent the successful conduct of the business has also been held a sufficient
ground for disgolution. Green v. Nat'l Adv. & Amusement Co., 137 Minn.
65, 162 N. W. 1056 (1917); Nashville Packet Co. v. Neville, 144 Tenn. 698,
235 S. W. 64 (1921) ; cf. In re American Pioncer Leather Co. Ltd., [1918]
1 Ch. 556. The extreme remedy of dissolution will not be decreed, however,
if the interests of the minority shareholders can be protected by granting
other relief. Thwing v. Minowa Co., 134 Minn. 148, 158 N. V. 820 (1916)
(order to pay money fraudulently withheld from minority shareholders).
In several states, statutes provide that dissolution shall be decreed under
certain conditions, such as fraudulent misapplication of corporate prop-
erty, insolvency, danger of waste of corporate assets through litigation, and
the like. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) c. 188, § 3443; Sheehy v. Barry, 87 Conn.
656, 89 Atl. 259 (1914) ; R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) c. 248, § 57; Richards v.
Cavalry Club of R. I., 101 Atl. 222 (R. I. 1917). Other statutes authorize
the court to order dissolution on "sufficient cause." W. Va. CODE ANN.
(Barnes, 1923) c. 53, § 57; Ward v. Hotel Randolph Co., 65 W. Va. 721, 63
S. E. 613 (1909); ILL. Rnv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 32, § 54; Giduitz v.
Cohn, 238 Ill. App. 227 (1925). Some courts, even under such broad stat-
utes, are inclined to order a dissolution only in the most extreme cases. Cf.
Gidwitz v. Cohen, supra. The instant decision seems in line with the pres-
ent tendency to grant a dissolution even in the absence of statute, when
a denial thereof, or a grant of other relief, will clearly result in further
financial loss and more litigation. BALLENTINE, op. cit. supra § 253; (1923)




IN BY-LAws AS DEFENSE TO SUIT FOR PAYMENT OF AGREED P=cE.-After
the organization of the plaintiff corporation, the defendant signed the fol-
lowing written agreement: "In consideration of the mutual promises of
others . . ., I promise to pay, for value received, to the treasurer of
the Dickinson County Hospital Co. the sum of two hundred and fifty dol-
lars in payment for five shares of stock at $50.00 per share." Specified pay-
ments were to be made on the happening of certain contingencies. In an
action on the instrument the defendant alleged (1) that the instrument
was a note given in payment for shares which he had never received, and
not a "subscription" therefor, and (2) that since the execution of the con-
tract, the by-laws of the corporation had been altered to make it one not
for profit. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the pleadings.
Held, on appeal, that the instrument was a "subscription" and that a
change of the by-laws would not discharge a subscriber, and, moreover, that
parol evidence of the alleged change in the character of the corporation
was not admissible to alter the terms of the written contract. Judgment
affirmed. Dickinson County Hospital Go. v,. Kessingcr, 279 Pac. 7 (Kan.
1929).
The sole question before the court in the instant case was whether the de-
fendant must pay the contract price of the shares. Yet opinions involving
judicial determination of this question frequently state a distinction be-
tween a "subscription" to shares and a "purchase" of shares. Lincoln Shoe
Co. v. Sheldon, 44 Neb. 279, 62 N. W. 480 (1895); Reagan v. Midland
Packing Co., 298 Fed. 500 (W. D. Iowa 1924). The courts appear to be
making this distinction depend on whether or not the defendant became a
shareholder at once. Granger v. Allen, 124 Misc. 599, 209 N.Y. Supp. 518
(Sup. Ct. 1925). The resulting inquiry into what constitutes shareholder-
ship seems both confusing and unnecessary. Frey, Contracts to Create
Shares (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 750, 770. It is not because he became a
shareholder that the defendant is obligated to pay, but the fact that he is
so obligated may be one of the legal incidents the aggregate of which com-
prises shareholdership. A tendency to make the defendant pay may be
attributed to the reluctance of the courts to relieve one ':subscriber" from
responsibility at the possible expense of the others and of the corporation
which may have incurred obligations in reliance on the asubscription.n
Note (1927) 34 W. VA. L. Q. 76; (1914) 12 MiCa. L. REv. 697. The
parties to such contracts, however classified by the courts, should still be
able to assert the usual defenses which are available against any contractor.
1 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 168. Thus, where the consideration
for the "subscriber's" contract is the promise of the corporation to create
shares as to him, and on account of subsequent insolvency it becomes unable
to do so, there is held to be a failure of consideration, and payment of the
full amount of the "subscription" cannot be enforced. Allen v. Ryan, 125
Misc. 521, 211 N. Y. Supp. 405 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Cramer v. Burnham, 107
Conn. 216, 140 Atl. 477 (1928). The court in the instant case disposes of
the defense of failure of consideration by finding the consideration to be
the mutual promises of the "subscribers.' Such reasoning, however, is gen-
erally criticized on the ground that the parties signing a "subscription"
agreement do not ordinarily intend to contract with each other. BALLAN-
TINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 33. Moreover, a "material" modification in
the character of the enterprise is held to release the "subscriber." Macon
Union Co-op. Ass'n v. Chance, 31 Ga. App. 637, 122 S. E. 66 (1924); 3
FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (1917) § 645. In the instant case the defendant
was held to be procluded by the parol evidence rule from asserting this de-
fense by showing that he had originally contracted for dividend paying
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shares which the plaintiff is not now in a position to create. The general
rule, however, is that, where a "subscription" contract has been entered into
in reliance on existing by-laws, the corporation cannot, by subsequent alter-
ation of the by-laws, change rights arising under such contracts. Kent V.
Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159 (1879); BALLANTINE, op. oit. supra
§ 181. Viewed from this standpoint, the result reached by the court in the
principal case seems questionable.
CRIMINAL LAw-ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT MANSLAUGHTER.-Tho
defendant was indicted for an assault with intent to commit murder, but
was convicted of "an assault with intent lo commit manslaughter." Held
on appeal (one justice dissenting), that thi conviction be affirmed. Lassiter
v. State, 123 So. 735 (Fla. 1929).
The courts of Florida have defined assault with intent to commit man-
slaughter as an offense where the crime would have been manslaughter
had death ensued. Williams v. State, 41 Fla. 295, 26 So. 184 (1899). Ef-
forts have been made to mark off the crime from attempted murder on
the one hand and mere aggravated assault on the other by weighing the
intent with which the offense was committed. See Newborn v. State, 73
Fla. 1064, 1065, 75 So. 581, 582 (1917); Grifin v. State, 72 Fla. 79, 86, 72
So. 474, 477 (1916). These efforts have led only to confusion. Thus, under
similar statutory provisions, it has been suggested that there could be no
such crime as assault with intent to commit manslaughter since intent to
kill would make the crime attemrpted murder. See People v. Lilley, 43 Mich.
521, 529, 5 N. W. 982, 988 (1880). But see State v. Throckmorton, 53 Ind.
354, 355 (1876). Certainly an intent to kill exists in fact whenever volun-
tary manslaughter is committed in the heat of passion. Cf. State v.
Throck-morton, supra; Disney v. State, 72 Fla. 492, 73 So. 598 (1916).
Even where no factual intent to kill exists, as when the completed crime
would be involuntary manslaughter arising from culpable negligence, the
decisions frequently impute such intent to the defendant. See Kelly v.
State, 78 Fla. 636, 642, 83 So. 506, 507 (1919). Aggravated assault is
said to be distinguishable from attempted manslaughter by a lack of
intent to kill. See Williams v. State, supra at 302, 26 So. at 187; New-
born v. State, supra at 1065, 75 So. at 582. Yet, by statutory definition,
aggravated assault precludes only premeditated intent. FLA. GEN. LAWS
(Skillman, 1927) § 7163. If the assault is one with a deadly weapon, it
is difficult to reconcile this distinction between the offenses by means of
intent with the doctrine that a man intends the reasonable and probable
consequences of his acts. Kelly v. State, supra,; see Ex Parte Brown, 40
Fed. 81, 86, (C. C. W. D. Ark. 1889). These endeavors to distinguish be-
tween attempted murder, assault with intent to commit manslaughter, and
aggravated assault, only serve to indicate the indefiniteness of the bound-
aries separating categories of crimes. It has been urged that courts and
juries might better focus directly on the penalty to be imposed, rather than
try to determine the penalty in the abstract by a consideration of "intent."
Tulin, The Role of Penalties in Criminal Law (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1048.
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-EXTRA-JUDICIAL IDENTIFICATION.-In a trial for
rape the prosecuting witness identified the defendant in court as her as-
sailant, and testified that she had so identified him in the police station
on the afternoon following the crime. She was cross-examined on this
point. The testimony of a police officer as to the details of what had been
said and done in the identification at the station house was then admitted
over the defendant's objection. The defendant was convicted. Held, on
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appeal, that the officer's testimony was inadmissible as hearsay. Judg-
ment reversed. Blake v. State, 145 At. 185 (Md. 1929).
Evidence of an extra-judicial identification of the defendant in a criminal
case is generally inadmissible. Murphy v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 120,
51 S. W. 940 (1899) (prior identification sought to be proved by testimony
of identifying witness herself); Houghton v. State, 43 Ore. 125, 71 Pac.
982 (1903) (testimony of third parties present at the prior identification) ;
People v. Johnson, 91 Cal. 265, 27 Pac. 663 (1891) (statement by pro"'ut-
ing witness soon after crime, purporting to describe the offender) ; Pcopla
v. Jung Hing, 212 N. Y. 393, 106 N. E. 105 (1914); McBride v. State, 20
Ala. App. 434, 102 So. 728 (1925); 2 WIGMORE, EVmWNCS (2d ed. 1923) §
1130. Contra: Commonwealth v. Rollins, 242 Mass. 427, 136 N. E. 360
(1922). The fact that the defendant was present and failed to deny the
identification does not make the evidence admissible as an admission by
silence. O'Toole v. State, 105 Wis. 18, 80 N. W. 915 (1899). Contra: State
v. Claymonst, 96 N. J. L. 1, 114 At. 155 (1921). The usual ground for ex-
clusion is that such evidence is hearsay. People v. Lukosrus, 242 Ill. 101, 89
N. E. 749 (1909). Where the identification in court has not been attacked,
the evidence of a prior identification is probably offered for the truth of the
matter asserted, and the hearsay rule might well apply. Reddicl: v. State,
35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 463, 34 S. W. 274 (1896). But where the identification
from the stand has been impeached, and evidence of a prior similar act is
offered in corroboration, it seems doubtful whether that testimony should
be open to the hearsay objection. Cf. Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F. (2d)
364 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (proof of prior consistent identification made beforo
existence of motive to fabricate, held admissible upon impeachment of
witness for bias). It has been suggested that an identification made noon
after the crime, before the suggestion of others could intervene to create
a fancied recognition in the witness' mind, probably has greater probative
value than any subsequent one, and that therefore evidence of such identi-
fication should be admissible. 2 WIGMLoRE, Op. Cit. Supra § 1130..
HABEAS ConRUs-RESTmAINT NECESSARY FOR WRIT TO ISSu--On a Sat-
urday morning, before surrendering to a sheriff who held a warrant for
his arrest, the petitioner obtained a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground
of excessive bail, representing that unless the writ issued forthwith ho
would be confined over the week-end. Held, on return of the writ, that
the writ be dismissed. Ex parte Weinberger, 147 AtL 217 (N. J. Eq. 1929).
The general rule seems to be that habeas corpus is available only where
the petitioner is in actual confinement, or where confinement is impending
and there are present the physical means of its enforcement Wales v.
Whitney, 114 U. S. 564 (1884); 1 BAMEY, HABEAS ComRUs (1913) § 6. But
where the writ is employed to determine the right to the custody of a minor,
the courts never inquire whether the minor is in fact physically restrained.
Dunham v. Dunham, 97 Conn. 440, 117 Atl. 504 (1922); Priesto v. St. At-
phonms Convent of Mercy, 52 La. An. 631, 27 So. 153 (1900); Ex parto
Bakley, 148 Fed. 56 (E. D. Va. 1906). Nor is actual confinement in a
prison or in the hands of an officer essential in cases where the petitioner,
drafted into an army camp, seeks the writ under a claim of exemption on
account of foreign citizenship. United Stdtes v. Mitchell, 248 Fed. 997
(E. D. N. Y. 1918); Arbitman v. Woodside, 258 Fed. 441 (C. C. A. 4th,
1919); ef. Chin Yaw v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 20 (1907).
A petitioner at large on bail or on parole is generally denied the writ.
Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S. 245, 33 Sup. Ct 240 (1913); Ex parte Davis,
11 Okla. Cr. Rep. 403, 146 Pac. 1085 (1917) ; In re Sills, 84 Kan. 660, 114
Pac. 856 (1911). Contra: Ex parte Foster, 44 Tex. Crim. App. 423, 71
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S. W. 593 (1903); Ex parte Snodgrass, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 350, 65 S. E.
106 (1902). But in exceptional circumstances, the writ has been allowed
ven when the petitioner was free on bond. Messervy v. Me.sservy, 80 S.
J. 285, 61 S. E. 445 (1908) (petitioner desired to attend school out of state,
his bond bhing conditione& on his not leaving state). The general rule has
been extended to deny the writ when the petitioner, at large on bond or
recognizance, has voluntarily submitted to temporary arrest in order to
make a case for habeas corpus. Ex parte Schmitz, 150 Cal. 663. 89 Pac.
438 (1907) ; In re Gow, 139 Cal. 242, 73 Pac. 145 (1903). But hero again,
exceptional circumstances have induced the court to grant the writ. Ex
parte Beach, 259 Fed. 956 (S. D. Cal. 1919) (federal officer in federal
court granted writ to test legality of arrest by state officials, in spite of
voluntary surrender) ; Ex pafte Overfield, 39 Nev. 30, 152 Pac. 568 (1915)
(voluntary surrender for purpose of obtaining writ in order to avoid sum-
mary removal on another state's requisition). The purpose of denying
the writ when the petitioner is under no physical restraint is to limit the
growing number of petitions. See In re Gow, supra at 243, 73 Pac. at 145.
But the instant situation would arise infrequently. It would seem that
here an exception to the general rule might well be made and the writ
granted in order to prevent a possibly unjust imprisonment at a time when
the court might be unavailable to the petitioner.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POWER OF SCHOOL DISTRICT TO INSURE IN
MUTUAL COMPANY.-A Pennsylvania statute authorized school districts to
insure their buildings in mutual fire insurance companies. PA. STAT.
(Supp. 1928) § 15860e. The defendant district was considering accepting
an offer of a mutual company to supply insurance for a certain sum with
a contingent liability to assessment limited to five times the initial deposit.
Taxpayers filed a bill in equity to restrain acceptance of this offer on the
ground that the statute authorizing this form of insurance violated art. 9,
§ 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides: "The General As-
sembly shall not authorize any county . . . or incorporated district to
become a stockholder in any company, association or corporation, or to
obtain or appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to any corporation,
association, institution or individual." A permanent injunction restraining
acceptance of the offer was issued. Held, on appeal, that the school district
by accepting the offer would not become a stockholder in the company or
be loaning its credit in the sense prohibited by the constitution. Judgment
reversed. Downing v,. School District of Erie. 147 At]. 239 (Pa. 1929).
Constitutional provisions similar to the one involved in the instant case
are common. ILL. CONST. sep. § 2; MICH. CONST. art. 10, §§ 12, 13; Mo.
CONST. art. 9, § 6; N. Y. CONST. art. 8, § 10. These provisions were adopted
in order to curb promiscuous wild cat speculation with public funds In
railroads and internal improvements. See Pleasant Township v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 138 U. S. 67, 74, 11 Sup. Ct. 215, 217 (1891); People v. State
Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, 504 (1871). They do not prohibit the approlria-
tion of public funds to an enterprise the purpose of which is public and
which is publicly owned and controlled. Sun Printing & Publishing Co. v.
Mayor of N. Y., 152 N. Y. 257, 46 N. E. 499 (1897) (subways); Dysart
v. City of St. Louis, 11 S. W. (2d) 1045 (Mo. 1928) (municipal airport);
Appeal of City Club of Philadelphia, 92 Super. Ct. 219 (Pa. 1927) (sub-
ways). Whether the purpose of an enterprise is public or private is a
matter of judicial interpretation and depends largely upon changing social
and economic conditions. See People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 475 (1870);
City of Tombstone u. Macia, 30 Ariz. 218, 226, 245 Pac. 677, 680 (1926) ;
Kneier, Municipal Functions and the Law of Public Purpose (1928) 76 U.
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OF PA.'L. REv. 824. These constitutional provisions, however, do prohibit
appropriations to or in aid of enterprises which, although in a sense bene-
ficial to the public, are privately owned and controlled. Washingtonian
Home r. City of Chicago, 157 Ill. 414, 41 N. E. 893 (1895) (private in-
stitution for inebriates) ; Ampt '. Cincinnati, 56 Ohio St. 47, 46 N. E. 69
(1897) (watirworks); Kulp v. City of Philadelphia, 291 Pa. 413, 140 At.
129 (1928) (civic opera co.). If the court, however, considers a private
enterprise to be of "unusual" public benefit, it will sometimes uphold con-
tributions of public money to it. Bourland r. Pollock, 157 Ark. 538, 249
S. W. 360 (1923) (association to aid poor); Jasper County Farm Bureau
v. Jasper County, 315 Mo. 560, 286 S. W. 381 (1926) (mutual benefit asso-
ciation of farmers) ; Sambor v. Hadley, 291 Pa. 395, 140 Ati. 347 (1928)
(Philadelphia Sesquicentennial). It has been held that a provision similar
to the one in the instant case does not prevent a school district from taking
out a non-assessable policy in a mutual insurance company. Johnson r'.
School Di.trict, 128 Ore. 9, 270 Pac. 764 (1928). But it does prohibit taking
out a policy on which liability for assessments is unlimited. School Districi
v. Twin Fails County Ins. Co., 30 Idaho 400, 164 Pac. 1174 (1917). When
liability is limited, as in the instant case, it has been held that a city may
take out such a policy. F rench v. Millille, 66 N. J. L. 392, 49 Atl. 465
(1901). Contra: City of Tyler v. Texas Eriployers' Ass'n, 288 S. W. 409
(Tex. 1926) ; see Johnson v. School District, supra at 12, 270 Pac. at 765.
In view of the purpose for which these constitutional provisions were
originally adopted, it would seem undesirable to apply them to the facts
of the instant case.
OIL AND GAs-DAAGES-DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TO DRILL
OIL VELL.-The plaintiff, owning oil leases in "wildcat" territory, assigned
a portion of the leases to the defendant in consideration of th t defendant's
promise to sink a test well thereon and furnish the plaintiff with full in-
formation as to developments. On failure of the Aefendant to drill the
well the plaintiff brought suit and recovered $30A damages. Held, on
appeal, that the proper measure of damages was "the value of the serv-
ices" agreed to be rendered in obtaining the geological information. Judg-
ment affirmed. Hoffer Oil Corp. -v. Carpenter, 34 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A.
10th, 1929).
The aleatory element in oil production has caused much confusion as to
the appropriate measure of damages for breach of a drilling contract.
The damages should vary with the nature of the plaintiff's intere-t in the
well. Where the defendant is merely hired to drill a well on land owned
or leased by the plaintiff, it is fairly well settled that the damages are the
cost of drilling (or completing) the well less the contract price. Covington
Oil Co. a'. Jones, 244 S. W. 287 (Tex. 1922); North Healdton Oil and Gas
Co. v. Skelley, 59 Okla. 128, 158 Pac. 1180 (1916); MILLS, LAW OF OIL
AND GAS (1926) § 218. In such cases loss of profits which would have
resulted from the sale of oil or leases has been held too speculative to be
recovered. Clarke v. Blue Licks Springs Co., 184 Iy. 827, 213 S. W. 222
(1919); Childers v. Tobin, 111 Kan. 347, 206 Pac. 876 (1922). When the
plaintiff leases land or assigns leases to the defendant who contracts to
drill and pay a royalty on oil produced, the difficulty of estimating the
loss has led some courts to allow, somewhat arbitrarily, the cost of drilling
as damages. Curry v. Texas Co., 18 S. W. (2d) 256 (Tex. 1929); All-
Aneican Oil & Gas Co. v. Connellee, 3 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924);
cf. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. a'. Stuard, 7 S. W. (2d) 878 (Te . 1928).
More truly compensatory is the measure adopted by other courts which
give as damages the value of the royalty the plaintiff would have received,
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as estimated by experts. Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Go., 263 Ill. 518, 105 N. E.
308 (1914); Wisdom v. Gwynn, 294 S. W. 917 (Tex. 1927). But of. Grass
v. Big Creek Development Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S. E. 750 (1915). There
is sufficient certainty in determining the plaintiff's damage to make this
the general rule where failure by the defendant to drill has resulted in
a loss of royalty through drainage by nearby wells. Blair v. Clear Creek
Oil and Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S. W. 286, 19 A. L. R. 430 (1921).
Where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff's interest is merely in the in-
formation to be obtained and its effect upon his nearby leases, the specu-
lative character of the enterprise causes more difficulty. Some courts
have allowed only nominal damages. Artwein v. Link, 108 Kan. 393, 195
Pac. 877 (1921); cf. Gibson v. Texas Co., 239 S. W. 671 (Tex. 1922);
Chamberlain v. Parker, 45 N. Y. 569 (1871). Other courts, apparently
influenced by cases where the defendant has no interest in the well, have
awarded the cost of drilling as damages. Okmulgee Producing and Re-
fining Co. v. Baugh, 111 Okla. 203, 239 Pac. 900 (1925); cf. Julian Petrol-
eum Corp. v. Courtney Petroleum Co., 22 F. (2d) 360 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ;
Bond v. Patrick, 195 Ky. 37, 241 S. W. 342 (1922). This has been criticized
as allowing the plaintiff the equivalent of a well on his own land in addition
to the information for which he bargained. See instant case, supra at 591.
The usual measure of damages for breach of a grahtee's covenant to build
on land conveyed is the difference between the value of the property re-
tained by the plaintiff and the value it would possess had the contract
been performed. Louisville R. R. v. Whipps, 118 Ky. 121, 80 S. W. 507
(1904), 4 Ann. Cas. 996 (1907); SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) §
702. While this principle seems impractical where future values are as un-
certain as in this type of oil lease, it was applied by one court where the
plaintiff showed that, regardless of the outcome of the test well, there was a
customary definite increase in the value of nearby leases as soon as a test
well was started. Sanzenbacher v. Howard-Clay Oil Co., 283 Fed. 13 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1922). Since the plaintiff has not permanently lost the increased
value of his leases, the rule of the instant case seems more appropriate. See
Atlantic Oil Producing Co. v. Masterson, 30 F. (2d) 481, 482 (C. C. A.
8th, 1929). A possible objection is that it leaves the jury with no test for
determining the value of the services rendered. As the only way to obtain
the information is by actual drilling, the value of such services would
seem to be the cost of drilling less the value to the defendant of the chance
to strike oil-i.e., less the value of the lease at the time it was assigned.
PLEDGES-WAREHOUSEMEN-RIGHT OF REPLEDGEE OF GOODS PLEDGED TO
WAREHOUSEMAN TO CLAIM ON A PARITY WITH WAREHOUSE RECEIPT HOLDERS
UPON INSOLVENCY OF PLEDGEE.-A trading company executed its promissory
note to a warehouse company, depositing 40,000 bags of flour as collateral
security. The warehouse company discounted the note to a bank, agreeing
at the same time to transfer all its rights under the note, and promising
to hold the pledged flour to the order of the bank. In a subsequent in-
solvency proceeding, the assignee in insolvency of the warehouse found,
in one indistinguishable and unsegregated mass, 91,000 bags of flour in
the warehouse. There were outstanding receipts for over 1,000,000 bags.
By consent of all parties the flour was sold. Upon distribution of the
proceeds the bant" was given a pro rata share. Objecting to this distri-
bution, the receipt holders brought suit for the entire proceeds. The
lower court held that the bank was not entitled to claim on a parity with
the plaintiffs. Held, on appeal (one judge dissenting), that the judgment




The several owners of grain confused by a warehouseman become tenants
in common of the confused mass. Ramsey v,. Rodcnburg, 72 Colo. 567, 212
Pac. 820 (1913). It would seem, therefore, that if the pledgor's debt to
the pledgee warehouse had been discharged, the pledgor would have become
a co-tenant with the warehouse receipt holders. And if the repledgee had
purchased the pledgor's interest upon foreclosure, and had thus acquired the
rights of the pledgor to the pledge, it, likewise, would have become entitled
to its proportionate share of the mass. But if there was not sufficient flour
at the time of the repledge to cover the outstanding receipts, the warehouse,
at that time, would have had no right to any portion of the flour as against
the warehouse receipt holders. See Hall v. Pillsbury, 43 Minn. 33, 36, 44
N. W. 673, 674, 7 L. R. A. 529 (1890). If such was the situation in the in-
stant case, and there had been no foreclosure sale upon which the repledgee
could base its claims, it could not have come in as a tenant in common,
since an assignment together of both a debt and pledge, where the pledge
is not a chose in action, conveys to the repledgee no more than the pledgees
interest in the pledge. See Climber Motor Corp. v. Fore, 273 S. W. 284,
287 (Tex. 1925); JONES, COLLATERAL SECURITIMS (1912) § 423; Parks,
Rights of a Pledgor on Transfers of a Pledge (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 173,
179. If there was flour in the warehouse at the time of the repledge suffi-
cient to satisfy the quantity called for by the outstanding receipts and the
pledge, the mere fact that there was no actual transfer of the pledged
flour would not defeat the validity of the repledge. Hibbard v. Merchants
Bank, 48 Mich. 118, 11 N. W. 834 (1882). The relationship of the re-
pledgee and the warehouse would then seem to have become that of bailor
and bailee; similar to the relationship of the receipt holders and the ware-
house. JONES, op. cit. supra § 297. It would seem to follow that the re-
pledgee and the receipt holders had like rights as against the warehouse,
and that, in the absence of a statute giving priority to the receipt holders,
the repledgee should be entitled to its proportionate share. The majority
opinion, however, ignores the matter of proof that there was sufficient
flour on hand at the time of the repledge.
RAILROADs-TORTs-STRicr REsPoNsmiwrry o RAILROADS FOR DAMAGE
CAUSED BY FIREs ORIGINATING ON RAiItROAD LAND.-An Ohio statute makes
a railroad "liable for all loss or damage by fires originating upon the
land belonging to it caused by operating such road." [OHIO GEN. CODE
(Page, 1926) § 8970] In a wreck resulting from the hauling of a de-
fective car on the defendant railroad, the defect being unknown to the
defendant, friction caused a fire which spread to adjoining land. In a
suit for damages the defehdant contended that it was not responsible,
since the fire did not result from use of fire in the operation of the road,
but from pure accident. Held, on demurrer to this defense, that the
statute extends to all fires on railroad land however caused, and that it is
constitutional. Demurrer sustained. Dickelman v. Penn. R. R., 34 F. (2d)
70 (N. D. Ohio, 1929).
In the absence of statute a railroad is responsible for damage by fire if
the injury caused is the "natural and probable consequence" of its negli-
gence. Hoag v. Lake Shore and Al. S. R. R., 85 Pa. 293 (1877); Smith v.
London and Liv. R. R., L. R. 6 C. P. 14 (1870). Although the case is
sent to the jury on the issue of negligence, as a practical matter the high
degree of care required of a railroad makes it responsible if the evidence
shows the fire was set on its land. See Webb v. Ronte, W. and 0. R. R.,
49 N. Y. 420 (1872); Chicago and E. R. R. v. Luddington, 10 Ind. App.
636, 38 N. E. 342 (1894). Many statutes similar to that in the instant
case have been held to make railroads responsible for all fires set on
1930]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
railroad property in operating the railroad, even in the absence of negli-
gence. Martin v. N. Y. and N. E. R. R., 62 Conn. 331, 25 Atl. 239 (1892) ;
Safford v. Boston and M. R. R., 1I03 Mass. 583 (1870). In all the cases
in which these statutes have been held constitutional the fires were
"kindled" b'y the railroad. Cf. St. Louis and San .Francisco Ry. v. Mat.
hews, 165 U. S. 1, 17 Sup. Ct. 243 (1897); Baltimore and 0. R. R. v.
Kreager, 61 Ohio St. 312, 56 N. E. 203 (1899). It has been suggested that
these statutes merely reestablished the early common law absolute respon-
sibility. See St. Louis and S. F. Ry. v. Mathews, supra at 9, 17 Sup. Ct.
at 246. But even under this strict common law rule a railroad would
ordinarily be responsible only for fires actually kindled by the railroad
or its authorized agents in the operation of the road. Cf. Southern Ry.
v. Power and Fuel Co., 152 Fed. 917 (C. C. A. 4th, 1907) (railroad held
not responsible for fire caused by a drunken employee while off duty al-
though on railroad's land); Brown v. Carolina Midland Ry., 67 S. C.
481, 46 S. E. 283 (1903) (railroad held responsible for fires set by em-
ployees to heat station) ; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts (1894)
7 HARv. L. REv. 441, 448. Yet in these cases the courts have recognized
that in effect the railroad was being made an insurer against the hazardous
incidents of its business. See St. Louis and S. F. Ry. v. Matthews, supra
at 26, 17 Sup. Ct. at 252. In the instant case the extension of responsibility
to include fires starting by accident on railroad land, while achieving the
results of the theory of absolute responsibility, is rested upon the ground
that the industry is best fitted to carry the losses caused by unavoidable
fires. Placing responsibility on an industry for such losses is probably not
unconstitutional. Cf. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400,
39 Sup. Ct. 553 (1919); New York Central v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37
Sup. Ct. 247 (1917). The articulation of the problem in terms of "insur-
ance" instead of "fault" more clearly emphasizes the factors involved.
SUBROGATION-MORTGAGES--PAYMENT OF JUST CLAIM NOT OTHERnwis
ENFORCEABLE AS CONDITION PRECEDENT TO QUIETING TITLE.-The defendant
Nelson, guardian and husband of the plaintiff, who had been judicially de-
clared insane, satisfied a valid mortgage due on the plaintiff's realty to
bank A, using $800 of his own money and $1200 borrowed for the purpose
from bank B. Being unable to repay bank B out of the crops of the cur-
rent year, the guardian executed a mortgage of $2000 on the same realty
to bank C, using $1200 of the proceeds to pay bank B. This mortgage,
having been executed without authority, the plaintiff, by a new guardian,
brought suit to quiet title. The'defendants, assignees of bank C, claimed
a lien for $1200 on the land by subrogation to the valid mortgage of bank
A. The trial court upheld this contention. Held, on appeal, that the
judgment be modified to the extent of decreeing the mortgage invalid and
unenforceable, but only on condition that the plaintiff reimburse the de-
fendants to the extent of $1200. Nclson v. Nclson, 226 N. W. 476 (N. D.
1929).
Where one has loaned money without security, or on a mortgage executed
without authority, he may still, under certain conditions, be secured if the
money loaned has been used to discharge a valid lien. An agreement for
subrogation of the lender to the security of the original lienor will be
enforced as between the parties. Kent v. Bailey, 181 Iowa 489, 164 N. W.
852 (1917). Even in the absence of such an agreement, where the money
was lent for the purpose of discharging a valid lien, and was so used, sub-
rogation has been allowed an unsecured lender. Smith v. Sprague, 244
Mich. 577, 222 N. W. 207 (1928). Likewise, where a mortgage that is
given turng out to be void for lack of authority to execute it, the mortgagee
will ordinarily be subrogated. Hughes v. Thomas, 131 Wis. 315, 111 N.
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W. 474 (1907); Calatmet & Chicago Canal & Dock Co. v. Davis, 218 II.
App. 176 (1920); Note (1926) 43 A. L. R. 1393. Contra: Brown v. Rouse,
125 Cal. 645, 58 Pac. 267 (1899). It seems, however, that subrogation
will not be allowed where the money was used to satisfy a debt secured
by an invalid lien, which in turn had been incurred to discharge a valid
lien. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Buck, 108 Ind. 174, 9 N. E. 153 (1886); see
Henry v. Henry, 73 Neb. 746, 752, 103 N. W. 441, 107 N. W. 789, 790
(1906). Nor will a lender be subrogated to a lien discharged with the
money borrowed from him if he did not lend it specifically for that purpose.
Gunter v. Ludlam, 155 Ark. 201, 244 S. W. 348 (1922). But where an
action for equitable relief is brought against the lender, he may be secured
without subrogation by resort to the equitable maxim: "He who seeks
equity must do equity." Thus where, as in the instant case, the action
is to remove as a cloud upon title the apparent lien of the unauthorized
mortgage, the petitioner may be required, as a condition to the relief
sought, to discharge an obligation binding in good conscience but not necez-
sarily otherwise enforceable either at law or in equity. Cf. Henry v.
Henry, supra; Nellis v. Minton, 91 Okla. 75, 216 Pac. 147 (1923) (claim
unenforceable affirmatively because of statute of limitations); Buzson v.
Moffatt, 173 Cal. 685, 161 Pac. 259 (1916) (illegal consideration); Lindsay
v. United States Savings & Loan Co., 127 Ala. 366, 28 So. 717 (1900)
(requiring petitioners in suits for rescission of usurious contract to pay
legal interest, although statute provided that no usurious contract could
be enforced either at law or in equity, except as to principal) ; 1 POMEoy,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) §§ 388-394.
TAXATION-CORPORATIONs--"DOING BUSINESS" WITHIN THE MEANING OF
CAPITAL STOCK TAx.-The plaintiff corporation sued to recover capital
stock taxes levied under the Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1924 [42 STAT. 294
(1921), 26 U. S. C. § 1000 (1926) ; 43 STAT. 325 (1924), 26 U. S. C. § 700
(1926)], which it had paid under protest. These statutes, by their terms,
did not purport to tax corporations not "engaged in business" during the
preceding year. The main purpose of the plaintiff's incorporation was to
facilitate the sale of lands previously held individually. The corporation's
principal activities during the taxing periods in issue 'consisted in (1)
the purchase of intervening parcels of land to eliminate fire hazards and
of another parcel suitable for a mill or railway terminal, (2) the sale
of a portion of its land and the distribution of the proceeds among its
shareholders, and (3) the negotiation of a contract for the construction
of a logging railway to be operated by prospective vendees. Held, that the
plaintiff was not "engaged in business," and that judgment be entered for
the amount of the taxes paid. Clallam Lumber Co. v'. United Statea, 34 F.
(2d) 944; 34 F. (2d) 947 (D. Mich. 1929) (two cases).
It is imperative that a federal capital stock tax be based upon the
transaction of business, because, if construed as a tax upon mere ownership
of property, it would be unconstitutional as a direct tax unless it was ap-
portioned. See Fink Coal Co. v. Heiner, 26 F. (2d) 136, 139 (W. D. Pa.
1928). A corporation which has leased its business property and is engaged
only in collecting the rent is not "doing business" within the meaning of
the statutes. Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate, 220 U. S. 187, 31 Sup. Ct.
361 (1910); United States v. Nipissing Mines Co., 206 Fed. 431 (C. C. A.
2d, 1913); West End Ry. v. Malley, 246 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917). But
elf Associated Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 258 Fed. 800 (C. C. A. 9th,
1919) (corporation created to own and lease pipe lines to the two creating
corporations). Even where it makes necessary repairs on its leased prop-
erty, the corporation is not "doing business." Jasper Ry. v. Walker, 238
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Fed. 533 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917). But the rule is otherwise if the lessor cor-
poration makes additions to its property beyond the repairs necessary for
use by the lessee in its original stite. Public Service Ry. v. Moffett, 227
Fed. 494 (D. N. J. 1915); Public Service Electric Co. v. Herold, 227 Fed.
486 (D. N. J. 1915). But cf. Miller v. Snake River Ry., 223 Fed. 946 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1915) (cost of permanent improvements made by lessee sub-
tracted from rent, lessor held not taxable). And it is similarly taxable
if it maintains an inspection or supervision over the operations of the
lessee. Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503, 37 Sup. Ct. 201
(1916); Chemung Iron Co. v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 368 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920).
But a corporation which has merely leased its business property may main-
tain its organization ready to resume operation on the termination of the
lease without being taxable. McCoach v. Minehill Ry., 228 U. S. 295, 33
Sup. Ct. 419 (1912); State Line Ry. v. Davis1 228 Fed. 246 (M. D. Pa.
1915). The general rule has been laid down that the exemption "'when not
engaged in business" is practically equivalent to "when not pursuing the
end for which the corporation was organized . . . where that end is
profit." See Edwards v. Chile Copper Co., 270 U. S. 452, 455, 46 Sup. Ct.
345, 346 (1925). Hence, where the corporation is merely owning or leasing
out property, it would seem necessary to consider how closely these func-
tions are related to the primary purposes of the corporation. On facts
analogous to those of the Instant case a contrary result has been reached.
Harmer Coal Co. v. Heiner, 26 F. (2d) 729 (W. D. Pa. 1928) (possessing
undeveloped coal land held to constitute "doing business") ; Monroe Timbal
Co. v. Poe, 21 F. (2d) 766 (W. D. Wash. 1927) (buying timber land for
future use). Contra: Lane Timber Co. v. Hunsen, 4 F. (2d) 666 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1925). The plaintiff in the instant case seems clearly to have
been transacting such business as should make it taxable under the rule of
Edwards v. Chile Copper *Co., aupra.
TAXATION-ESTATE TAX-DEDUCTION oF CLAiMs AGAINST THE ESTATE-
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTs.-In an antenuptial contract, the decedent prom-
ised that his wife should be paid out of his estate, in case she survived
him, the sum of $75,000 in lieu of her dower and other statutory rights.
His will provided that she could take at her election the life interest in a
trust fund of $500,000 in place of the $75,000. More than a year after his
death, the widow notified the executors of her decision to accept the bequest
in the will. The statute providing for the federal estate tax reads: "That
for the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate shall be determined
-(a) by deducting from the value of the gross estate (1) . . . c1aimo
against the estate," etc. [42 STAT. 279 (1921), 26 U. S. C. § 1095a (1926)]
The estate attempted to deduct the $75,000. The Board of Tax Appeals
disallowed the deduction. 9 B. T. A. 636 (1927). Held, on appeal (one
judge dissenting), that there was no "claim" within the meaning of the
statute. Judgment affirmed. Jacobs v. Commissioner of Internal Rcrenue.
34 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
The courts generally hold, as in the instant case, that where a widow
does not assert her statutory or contract rights against her husband's
estate but accepts an optional bequest instead, the amount of the original
claim may not be deducted in determining the estate tax. Title Guca,anler
and Trust Co. v. Edwards, 290 Fed. 617 (S. D. N. Y. 1922); Bri.-cn v
Craig, 32 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929). Such a result is based on the
reasoning that the original claim is extinguished by the exercise of the
option. Schuette v. Bowers, 32 F. (2d) 817 (S. D. N. Y. 1929). The value
of the estate to be taxed, however, is usually estimated as of the time
when the decedent died. Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct.
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291 (1924) ; Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151, 49 Sup. Ct.
291 (1929). And at that time, before the widow has exercised her option,
there is no qaestion that she has a legally enforceable claim. Fcrguson
av. Dicksm,, 300 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924). Furthermore, the federal
estate tax has been construed as being a tax imposed on the right of
succession from the decedent and not a tax on the property itself. See
Randolph v. Craig, 267 Fed. 993, 995 (M. D. Tenn. 1920); New York;
Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349, 41 Sup. Ct. 506, 507 (1921). The
payment of an obligation is said not to be a succession in this sense. See
Matter of Vanderbilt's Estate, 184 App. Div. 661, 667, 172 N. Y. Supp.
511, 515 (1st Dep't 1918). Hence, a bequest in satisfaction of a debt is
generally taxable only as to its excess above the amount enforceable as a
claim by legal action. PINKERTON AND MILLSAPS, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE
TAXES (19126) § 328. Since an antenuptial contract gives the widow a
valid, enforceable claim against her husband's estate, it is submitted that
an optional bequest in the will in lieu of the amount of such claim amounts
to a legacy in payment of the debt. See Hill v. Treasurer and Receier
General, 227 Mass. 331, 335, 116 N. E. 509, 510 (1917). It has been held
that where a widow accepts the provision in her husband's will in place
of her statutory rights in the estate, payments so made to her are not
taxable income until they exceed the value of her statutory interest.
United States v. Bolster, 26 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928); Allen v.
Brandeis, 29 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). Hence, in one respect at
least, the fact that the widow exercises the option under the will does not
increase the tax liability. It would seem that to the extent of the original
claim the value of the provision in the will accepted in lieu thereof might
well be allowed as a deduction in computing the estate tax.
TRUSTS-CiiARTABLE TRUSTS-SCHOLARSHIPS AND TUITION LOAN FUNDS.
-The testator devised his residuary estate in trust to the defendant to
be accumulated for ten years and then to be delivered to Northwestern
University, the principal and income to be utilized perpetually for loans
to "worthy students to enable them to pay their tuition." The loans were
to be for periods of four years with interest. The testator's heirs brought
suit to have the trust declared void, claiming that the bequest was non-
charitable since interest was to be charged and since the loans were not
restricted to "needy" students. The lower court gave judgment for the
defendant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Summers v.
Chicago Title and Trust Co., 167 N. E. 777 (Ill. 1929).
The fact that tuition is charged by an educational institution does not
of itself render a bequest in trust to such institution non-charitable.
Butterworth v. Keeler, 219 N. Y. 446, 114 N. E. 803 (1916). But the
contrary is true if the institution is operated for profit. Stratton v. Physio-
Medical College, 149 Mass. 505, 21 N. E. 874 (1889). A bequest for the
creation of loan scholarships may create a charitable trust despite the
fact that interest is charged on the loans, where the interest is itself to
be used for further loans, rather than for private profit. Morgan v. Nat.
Trust Bank, 331 11. 182, 162 N. E. 888 (1928). The fact that preference
in awarding the scholarships is to be given to the descendants of the set-
tlor does not render the trust non-charitable. Gallaher v. Gallahe-r, 146
S. E. 623 (W. Va. 1929). And it has been held that a fund established
to pay the tuition only of the testator's descendants was a charitable trust
where it was further provided that, in those years when not used by such
descendants, the income was to be used for those purposes of the college
which might be deemed most useful. Dexter v. Harvard College, 176 Mass.
192, 57 N. E. 371 (1900); cf. Johnson v. DePauu, Univ., 116 Ky. 671, 76
S. W. 851 (1903) (trust held non-charitable where there was no provision
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for use for general educational purposes in those years when not used by
the testator's descendants). In the instant case the court emphasized the
use of the word "enable" as restricting the loans to needy students, and
implied that the trust might have been non-charitable had the loans not
been so restricted. But it has been held that a fund for the awarding of
scholarships on the basis of an examination constituted a charitable trust
even though there was no discrimination between rich and poor. Hoyt v.
Bliss, 93 Conn. 344, 105 Atl. 699 (1919). It thus appears in most of the
cases that almsgiving is not a necessary quality of a charitable trust for
educational purposes. The essential characteristics of such a trust are
rather the non-profit-making nature of the institution, and the use for
educational purposes for the benefit of the general public rather than for
the sole benefit of named individuals or families.
TRUSTS--VALIDITY OF TRUSTS OF REALTY CONTAINING PROVISIONS FOR
DISPOSITION AFTER SETTLOR'S DEATI.-F conveyed to her daughter, the
defendant, all of her real estate by warranty deed, which was not recorded
until F's death, and on the same day the defendant executed a declaration
of trust of such realty for the benefit of her brothers and sisters. The
grantor managed the property and received the rents up to the time of
her death. The plaintiff claimfed as heir at law of the grantor, contending
that the transaction constituted a testamentary disposition invalid under
the statute of wills. The lower court gave judgment for the defendant.
Held, on appeal, that the decree be affirmed. O'Loghlin v. Prendergast,
168 N. E. 96 (Mass. 1929).
Where a trust of personalty is created with a reservation of a certain
amount of power and control during the life of the settlor, the courts
look to the extent of the control retained to determine whether the settlor
intended it as a testamentary disposition, which would be invalid if not
in compliance with the statute of wills. Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
1135. But in the case of a conveyance of land to a trustee under the
conditions above stated, the courts adopt an entirely different viewpoint,
namely, that upon delivery of the deed, a property interest is at once
transferred. Thus where, by agreement, the grantor delivered a deed and
the grantee made a declaration of trust, whereby the grantor was to re-
ceive one-half the net income for life, th6 property then to be distributed
according to the provisions in the trust, it was held that this did not
constitute a testamentary disposition since the deed passed a present in-
terest in the land. Roberts v. Taylor, 300 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924).
Similarly where land was conveyed by deed of trust with a reservation
of the power to revoke and to convey to others during the life of the
grantor the transaction was held non-testamentary. Sims v. Brown, 252
Mo. 58, 158 S. W. 624 (1913). And even where the settlor retained
full control, thus clearly manifesting an intent to dispose of the property
after death, the same result was reached. Pattersion v. McClenathan, 296
111. 475, 129 N. E. 767 (1921); cf. Pietsch v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 164
Wis. 368, 160 N. W. 184 (1916). But where a deed of trust expressly
purported to take effect only at the death of the grantor, it was held to be
testamentary in character. Niccolls v. Niccolls, 168 Cal. 444, 143 Pac. 712
(1914). Thus the mere execution and delivery of a deed on trust of real
estate, regardless of the amount of control retained by the grantor, will
enable one to evade the formalities prescribed in the statute of wills.
The approach apparent in cases of trusts of personalty affords a more
rational and less arbitrary basis for disposing of the question. Although
the grantor in the instant case did in fact exercise full control over the
conveyed premises, the holding may be justified on the ground that there
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was no stipulation in the declaration of trust providing for such control.
It would seem that the fact that the declaration of trust was made by the
grantee should be immaterial where the declaration of truzt and the con-
veyance by the grantor were made as one transaction. Cf. Roborta v.
Taylor, supra.
